We show that incomplete cartels in quantity-setting oligopolies may increase welfare, without any e¢ ciencies or synergies being internalized by cartel formation. The main intuition is that the cartel has an incentive to contract output and that the …rms outside the cartel react to this by expanding output. If the outsiders are more e¢ cient than the cartel …rms average production costs go down. Even for relatively moderate di¤erences in e¢ ciency total welfare may increase due to this market-induced rationalization.
Introduction
It is generally accepted that collusion decreases social welfare. Price …xing agreements increase industry pro…ts at the expense of consumer welfare and the resulting reduction in output creates deadweight losses. Some examples of 'e¢ cient cartels' have been explored in the literature. Collusion may, for example, be the appropriate response to the non-existence of competitive equilibrium when there are large …xed costs or increasing returns to scale (Sjostrom, 1989) . Moreover, it has been suggested that cartels may lead to increased output because: …rms invest in capacity to increase their share in the cartel (Matsui, 1989) ; …rms share information (Stennek, 2003) ; or the cartel acts as a Stackelberg leader in the presence of a competitive fringe (Daughety, 1990, Montero and Guzman, 2010) . Nevertheless, competition authorities still treat collusion as unquestionably harmful to society. For mergers, on the other hand, e¢ ciencies are considered to be a real possibility. Examples are the circumvention of …xed costs (Salant et al., 1983) , or synergies leading to marginal costs for the merged entity that are lower than marginal costs for any of its constituent …rms (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990, Cheung, 1992) . A particular type of e¢ ciency, requiring no technological advance, occurs when an e¢ cient …rm (that is, a …rm producing against low marginal costs) merges with a less e¢ cient …rm. The merged entity can then shift production from the ine¢ cient to the e¢ cient plant, thereby reducing aggregate production costs. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) refer to this phenomenon as rationalizing production. However, for cartels without side payments it seems di¢ cult to redistribute production -let alone to shut down plants -such that all …rms bene…t, while simultaneously increasing welfare. Bos and Pot (2012) explore this possibility.
In this paper we identify a di¤erent mechanism through which collusion (or a horizontal merger) may increase welfare, which we refer to -following Stennek (2003) -as market-induced rationalization. This occurs when …rms that are less e¢ cient than others collude and contract their output. The optimal response of the non-colluding, but more e¢ cient, …rms, is to expand their production, provided they compete in quantities. Aggregate output as well as average production costs will then decrease. If the reduction in costs is large enough, social welfare may increase. Note that the cartel does not internalize some particular e¢ ciency, nor does it increase output; the welfare enhancement is solely due to the response of the market to collusion.
Using a stylized market structure with two products we consider a cartel of …rms producing one of the products. We show that such an incomplete cartel may increase welfare through market-induced rationalization, a result that up till now has not been explicitly acknowledged in the literature. 1 Section 2 introduces the market structure, and conditions for the cartel to increase welfare are identi…ed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. The proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Market structure and incomplete cartels
Market demand originates from a representative consumer spending his income on commodities 1 and 2 and on a composite commodity 0, where the latter represents expenditures on all commodities other than the …rst two. Preferences of this consumer are represented by the utility function
with Q i consumption of commodity i, i = 0; 1; 2 and a; b > 0 preference parameters. The parameter # 2 (0; 1] measures the degree of substitutability between commodities 1 and 2, with # = 1 implying perfect substitutability. The consumer maximizes utility given his budget constraint Q 0 + P 1 Q 1 + P 2 Q 2 M , where M is the available income, P 1 and P 2 are the prices of commodities 1 and 2 and the composite commodity's price equals 1. For M high enough, inverse demand functions for the …rst two commodities follow as P 1 (Q 1 ; Q 2 ) = a bQ 1 b#Q 2 and P 2 (Q 1 ; Q 2 ) = a b#Q 1 bQ 2 :
Production takes place in industries 1 and 2, with n …rms in industry 1 producing commodity 1 against constant marginal costs c 0, and m …rms in industry 2 producing commodity 2 against marginal costs d 0. We assume c d and introduce = c d a c
as a measure of the production e¢ ciency di¤erence between producers of the two commodities (note that the denominator a c equals the maximum gains from trade from production of commodity 1). Firms compete with quantities as strategic variable (Cournot competition) in both industries. Market equilibrium can be characterized as follows.
Then the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is given by all …rms in industry 1 producing q 1 and all …rms in industry 2 producing q 2 , where
and (2)
Total production is given by Q 1 = nq 1 and Q 2 = mq 2 , equilibrium prices by P 1 = c + bq 1 and P 2 = d + bq 2 and …rm pro…ts by 1 = (P 1 c) q 1 = b (q 1 ) 2 and 2 = (P 2 c) q 2 = b (q 2 ) 2 , respectively.
Note that for e¢ ciency di¤erences larger than , …rms in industry 1 are inactive in equilibrium.
We now analyze the e¤ect of a cartel agreement between all …rms in industry 1. The objective of the cartel is to set the total quantity of commodity 1 such that aggregate pro…ts of …rms from industry 1 are maximized. Firms from industry 2 still compete in quantities. (
and is always bene…cial to …rms from industry 2.
The decrease in consumer welfare is consistent with the …nding that mergers in Cournot competition with homogeneous goods increase consumer prices if no technological e¢ ciencies materialize (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990) .
Condition (3) also generalizes the well known merger paradox (Salant et al. 1983 ) which says that mergers (or incomplete cartels) in quantity competition are only pro…table if enough …rms join. In fact, for # = 1, our condition (3) reduces to n > (m + 1) 2 which is equivalent to equation (3 0 ) from Salant et al. (1983, p.191) . It implies that the cartel in industry 1 is pro…table only if industry 1 contains at least four times as many -but typically even much more -…rms as industry 2. The reason is that the non-colluding …rms respond to the contraction of output by the cartel by expanding output themselves. This decreases the cartel's pro…t and may outweigh the bene…ts of the agreement. The scope for pro…table incomplete cartels widens for increasing marginal costs (Perry and Porter, 1985) , price competition (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985) , or nonlinear demand (Cheung, 1992) . Limited substitutability also softens the merger paradox: the lower bound in (3) decreases with a decrease in #.
In particular, for # < q 1 1 2 p 2 0:54 the cartel in industry 1 is pro…table for all possible values of n and m. 2 The fact that the cartel is less pro…table for small values of n also has rami…cations for cartel sustainability. As long as condition (3) holds the cartel is sustainable if the discount factor is high enough, but this critical discount factor is non-monotonic in n. 3 This is due to cartel pro…ts being low -giving strong incentives to deviate and therefore requiring a high discount factor -either when n is small and condition (3) only just holds, or when n is large.
Welfare enhancing incomplete cartels
The impact of the cartel on total welfare, which we de…ne as the sum of consumer utility and aggregate pro…ts, is ambiguous: consumers are harmed, …rms from industry 2 gain, and …rms from industry 1 may gain or lose (see Proposition 2). Figure 1 illustrates, for the case of perfect substitutes (# = 1), how these di¤erent e¤ects can be balanced against each other. 2 Note that the e¢ ciency di¤erence has no e¤ect on pro…tability of the cartel, although it does determine market shares of individual …rms. Therefore the minimal number of …rms to join for pro…tability might represent an arbitrarily small market share. In particular, the market share of industry 1 …rms, Q 1 = (Q 1 + Q 2 ), equals nm( ) n+m+m , for # = 1; which becomes arbitrary small for close enough to . 3 It is straightforward to show that, assuming …rms use grim trigger strategies, the critical discount factor for a sustainable cartel in the in…nitely repeated game is given by = (n 1) (m + 1) (n + 1) mn# 2 2 ((m + 1) (n 1) mn# 2 ) ((m + 1) (n 2 + 6n + 1) (n + 3) mn# 2 ) :
This critical discount factor is increasing in m and #, non-monotonic in n and strictly below 1 as long as condition (3) holds.
-6 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Figure 1 : Illustration of welfare e¤ects of incomplete cartel for perfect substitutes.
Aggregate output and output of industry 2 in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium are given by Q and Q 2 , respectively. The decrease in aggregate output to Q K , due to the cartel contracting its output, is mitigated because …rms from industry 2 respond by expanding their output from Q 2 to Q K 2 . The price increases from P to P K and consumers are worse o¤: The change in total welfare is T K T = F (C + E). The last part, (C + E), is the standard loss in consumer surplus and industry pro…ts which arises when aggregate output falls below its competitive level. The other, non-standard, part, F = (c d) Q K 2 Q 2 , gives cost savings that result from the redistribution of output to industry 2. If these savings are large enough total welfare may increase.
The e¢ ciency di¤erence should be su¢ ciently high for the cost reduction to outweigh the deadweight loss from the decrease in production. Moreover, also the ability of the cartel to reduce aggregate output, and the strength of the output expansion response of industry 2 are important determinants of the scope for welfare increasing cartels.
The following result helps investigating the conditions under which welfare enhancing cartels exist.
Lemma 3 Let n be the number of …rms in industry 1 for which total welfare is maximized. Then there exist numbers L and H , with L < H < , such that (i): for H < we have n = 0; (ii) if L > 0, we have n n for 0 < L .
Lemma 3 implies that, for L < < H , welfare typically improves with a decrease in the number of …rms in industry 1. This suggests that there exists a range of values of (containing the interval H ; ) for which a cartel of industry 1 …rms increases total welfare. Proposition 4, which is our main result, speci…es this interval. This lower bound satis…es L < H (n; m; #) < H and decreases in n and #.
Note that the mechanism through which the cartel may improve welfare is closely related to the one responsible for the merger paradox: the more e¢ cient non-colluding …rms respond to output contraction of the cartel by expanding their output. This output expansion makes the cartel less pro…table, and it decreases average production costs. The question therefore arises whether cartels exist that are simultaneously pro…table and welfare enhancing. The shaded areas in Figure 2 provide examples of such market structures and suggest that they are a real possibility. The vertical lines correspond to condition (3) and the dashed curves correspond to condition (4). Departing from perfect substitutability (by decreasing # below 1) increases the scope for pro…table cartels substantially, but does not severely limit the possibility for an increase in total welfare. Proposition 4 and Figure 2 show that the scope for welfare enhancing cartels increases with an increase in n or #. When commodities are close substitutes an increase in m also makes welfare enhancing cartels more likely. The intuition for the e¤ect of # is straightforward: if commodities are closer substitutes industry 2 will expand output more in response to a cartel in industry 1. The e¤ects of n and m are harder to interpret. An increase in n, for example, implies that the cartel will contract output more and consequently that industry 2 will expand output more. The net result of these two e¤ects turns out to be always positive.
The required e¢ ciency levels in Figure 2 range from rather low (H (20; 3; 1) 0:036) to quite high values (H (2; 1; 0:54) 0:85). The case of perfect substitutes combined with perfect competition in industry 1 gives lim n!1 H (n; m; 1) = 1= [m (2m + 5)] as a lower bound of the required e¢ ciency di¤erence. This lower bound become arbitrarily small for increasing m.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we introduced a mechanism by which incomplete cartels may (unintentionally) increase social welfare in quantity setting oligopolies. Non-colluding, but more e¢ cient, …rms expand output in response to the output contraction of the colluding …rms. The resulting decrease in average production costs may outweigh the deadweight loss from the decrease in aggregate production. These welfare enhancing cartels exist for reasonable parameter values in a stylized market with linear inverse demands and constant marginal costs, and do not require any synergies between the colluding …rms or other special features. In a similar fashion an incomplete cartel between producers of low quality products may be welfare enhancing when it leads to an increase in the supply of high quality products.
The phenomenon identi…ed here may be encountered in particular when a new technology or product is developed that is superior to the existing ones. This situation can typically be modeled by imperfect substitutability, like we do here. Incumbent …rms then risk losing market share and pro…ts, and may have a strong incentive to collude. Our analysis shows that this response might increase welfare and suggests that competition authorities should consider being lenient toward such cartels. Conversely, a cartel between e¢ cient …rms reduces welfare beyond the deadweight loss from decreased output, since it additionally leads to a shift of production to the ine¢ cient …rms.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Firm i in industry 1 sets its quantity q 1i in order to maximize h P P k6 =i q 1k + q 1i ; P k q 2k c i q 1i and …rm j in industry 2 sets its quantity q 2j to maximize h P 2 P k6 =j q 2k + q 2j ; The solution of which is given by q 1i = q 1 for i = 1; : : : ; n and q 2j = q 2 for j = 1; : : : ; m. Prices and pro…ts follow straightforwardly from this.
Proof of Proposition 2. Although n is an integer, for mathematical convenience we may treat it as a continuous variable. Di¤erentiating q 1 and q 2 with respect to n we …nd that both are decreasing in the number of …rms in industry 1:
The change in aggregate output then is: @Q 1 @n = q 1 + n @q 1 @n = m + 1 (m + 1) (n + 1) mn# 2 q 1 > 0 and @Q 2 @n = m @q 2 @n < 0:
Moreover, both prices decrease: @P 1 @n = b @q 1 @n < 0 and @P 2 @n = b @q 2 @n < 0:
Since the consumer faces lower prices and consumes positive amounts of both commodities he will be strictly better o¤ with an increase in n.
Consequently, formation of a cartel in industry 1, which is formally equivalent with a decrease of the number of …rms in that industry from n to 1 will increase both prices, decreases production of commodity 1 and increases production of commodity 2. Moreover, the consumer will be strictly worse o¤, and …rms from industry 2, who now sell more and at a higher price, will be better o¤. The cartel is pro…table if 1 (1; m) n 1 (n; m), or when q 1 (1; m) > p nq 1 (n; m) -that is, when the cartel does not restrain production by too much. This is the case for the values of n given by condition (3).
Proof of Lemma 3. Denote by q 1 (n; ) = q 1 and q 2 (n; ) = q 2 the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities when there are n …rms independently producing commodity 1 (where, for notational convenience, we suppress the dependence of q 1 and q 2 on m, # and (a c) =b). Consumer utility is then given by V (n; ) = M + 1 2 b n 2 [q 1 (n; )] 2 + 2#nmq 1 (n; ) q 2 (n; ) + m 2 [q 2 (n; )] 2 :
Aggregate pro…ts in industry 1 and industry 2 are given by 1 (n; ) n 1 = bn [q 1 (n; )] 2 and 2 (n; ) = m 2 = bm [q 2 (n; )] 2 , respectively. Total welfare, as a function of n and 4, is T (n; ) = V (n; ) + 1 (n; ) + 2 (n; )
= M + 1 2 b n (n + 2) [q 1 (n; )] 2 + 2#nmq 1 (n; ) q 2 (n; ) + m (m + 2) [q 2 (n; )] 2 :
Since T (n; ) is continuous in n we can take the derivative with respect to n. Using (5) from the proof of Proposition 2 we …nd 2 b @T (n; ) @n = 2q 1 (m + 1) (n + 1) mn# 2 ((m + 1) q 1 (n; ) m#q 2 (n; )) :
Moreover, (m + 1) q 1 (n; 4) m#q 2 (n; 4) is decreasing in n. This implies that T (n; ) is unimodal in n and has a unique global maximum which is given by the solution to @T (n; ) @n = 0. Now if (m + 1) q 1 (n; 4) m#q 2 (n; 4) for the actual value of n, then in the social optimum at least n …rms are active in the production of commodity 1. This gives It is easily checked that L < H < for # > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Substituting the expressions for q 1 (n; ) and q 2 (n; ) from (2) into (6) and solving T (1; ) > T (n; ) for we obtain, after some straightforward but tedious calculations, 4 > H (n; m; #).
The fact that T (n; ) is unimodal in n (see the proof of Lemma 3) implies that L < H (n; m; #) < H for all admissible values of n, m and #. Di¤erentiating H (n; m; #) with respect to n shows that @H @n has the same sign as 2 # 2 m + 2 (m + 1) 2 (m + 2) m# 2 ;
which is always negative. The derivative with respect to # is much more complicated but turns out to be negative for any admissible value of n, m and #.
Corollary 5 Consider the case of perfect substitutes, # = 1. A cartel of primary industry …rms is pro…table for the colluding …rms when n > (m + 1) 2 and welfare enhancing when > H (n; m; 1) = 2m + n + 3 m (2m 2 + (2n + 8) m + 5n + 7) :
Furthermore, H (n; m; 1) is decreasing in n and m:
Proof of Corollary 5. The pro…tability condition and condition (7) follow immediately from Propositions 2 and 4. Furthermore, the derivatives with respect to n and m are given by @H (n; m; 1) @n = 2 (m + 2) 2 m (2m 2 + (2n + 8) m + 5n + 7) 2 < 0 and @H (n; m; 1) @m = 2m (m (4m + 5n + 17) + 2 (n + 4) (n + 3)) + (n + 3) (5n + 7) m 2 (2m 2 + (2n + 8) m + 5n + 7) 2 < 0;
respectively.
